SECURITY STRATEGIC GOAL

Balance homeland and national security transportation requirements with
the mobility needs of the nation for personal travel and commerce

FY 2006 Enacted Funds: $828.5 Million

• All modes have implemented steps that would prepare them for a rapid recovery of transportation from international harm and natural disasters
• The U.S. transportation system meets National security for military use within DoD established readiness requirements timelines.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES

• Percent of DoD-required shipping capacity complete with crews available within mobilization timelines.
• Percent of DoD-designated commercial ports available
• Transportation Capability Assessment for Readiness Index Score (New measure in FY 2005).

STRATEGIC MOBILITY FY 2006 ENACTED FUNDS $254.1 MILLION

The Department of Defense (DoD) relies heavily on the U.S. commercial sector for surface cargo movement and sealift in order to maximize its logistics capabilities and minimize cost. The ability of the United States to respond to military contingencies requires adequate commercial and government-owned U.S.-flag sealift, the use of associated maritime infrastructure and skilled U.S. maritime labor. DOT manages four programs that help make these resources available to DoD.

DOT, through the Maritime Administration (MARAD), operates the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreements (VISA) program as the means used by the Department of Defense (DoD) to pre-plan the availability of militarily useful commercial vessels for DoD use in times of emergency. VISA constitutes DoD’s official emergency preparedness program for sealift. Approximately 77 percent, of the ship capacity enrolled in VISA is from the 60 U.S.-flag commercial vessels receiving Maritime Security Program (MSP) payments, managed by DOT. The remaining component of vessels enrolled in VISA is made up of ship operators transporting Federal Government preference cargoes and domestic cargoes. These operators are required to provide varying levels of ship capacity to VISA. All ships enrolled in VISA must commit certain percentages of their vessel capacity and use of their related intermodal transportation resources to DoD. In 2006, MARAD implemented the newly reauthorized MSP. The reauthorization expanded the program from 47 to 60 ships and increased the payment levels to MSP ship operators.

The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) is a fleet of 48 government-owned, militarily useful cargo ships that are owned and maintained by DOT and made available to DoD to support the rapid, massive movement of military unit equipment and supplies in times of emergency or war. These ships are also available for emergency response after domestic natural disasters. During 2006, the number of vessels assigned to the RRF fleet decreased by 10 ships. The Department of Defense determined that the RRF should reduce to 48 ships due to changing sealift requirements and shifting funding priorities. This resulted in the shift of two Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) vessels, four crane ships (TACS) and four small Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) vessels out the RRF.

MARAD also supports mariner education programs to help produce new merchant marine officers. In 2006, approximately 40 percent of these new mariners had an obligation to serve in the U.S. Navy Reserve/Merchant Marine Reserve for a period of six years. All of these graduates help to replenish the “pool” of mariners available to crew the RRF in times of need and to crew U.S.-flag commercial ships.

The ability of the United States to respond to military contingencies also requires the availability of adequate U.S. commercial port facilities. DOT, through MARAD, is responsible for establishing DoD's prioritized use of port facilities and related intermodal services and facilities during DoD mobilizations to ensure the safe, secure, and smooth flow of military cargo through the commercial U.S. transportation system while minimizing commercial cargo disruptions.

DoD, in conjunction with MARAD, negotiates a Port Planning Order with each designated strategic port, specifying which facilities will be needed to conduct a military deployment. The port is expected to be able to make these facilities available to the military within 48 hours of written notification. If a port forecasts that it will be unable to provide the specific facilities, or

provide acceptable alternative facilities within 48 hours, it will report that it is not available. MARAD conducts strategic commercial port planning and readiness activities to help ensure the availability of these ports for DoD use in times of emergency. These port planning and readiness activities include chairing the National Port Readiness Network (NPRN), monitoring port facility availability, maintaining security clearances at the strategic ports, maintaining security communication equipment at the strategic ports, participating in port readiness committee meetings and port

readiness exercises, completing semi-annual enhanced port readiness assessment reports, participating in area maritime security committee meetings, participating in American Port Authority Association (AAPA), Transportation Research Board (TRB), and National Defense Transportation Association (NDTA) activities, and leading the NPRN strategic port study. The port planning and readiness activities continue to train commercial port employees and help coordinate military deployment and redeployment moves through the strategic ports. DoD did not experience any strategic port delays in 2006.

2006 Results. DOT did not meet the performance target. In April 2006, MARAD was directed by the Commander of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to remove ten vessels from the RRF to the NDRF by July 27, 2006. Prior to this direction, the vessels had been maintained and kept in good repair to successfully activate in accordance with their prescribed time frames. With the concurrence of USTRANSCOM, MARAD immediately ceased all maintenance and repair in April on these vessels and commenced preparation for long term storage at the National Defense Reserve Fleet site.

By immediately discontinuing the preventative maintenance programs and ongoing repairs on these vessels, MARAD was able to avoid approximately $6.0 million in planned costs for the management and repair of these ten vessels. These savings were applied to the necessary actions for long term lay-up of the vessels at the NDRF sites and to pay for cancellation of the Ship Manager Contracts on these vessels. Additional savings were applied to deferred maintenance and service life extension projects on the balance of current RRF vessels.

FY 2007 Performance Forecast. DOT expects to meet the FY 2007 target.

2006 Results. DOT met the performance target. From 2003-2006, DoD has not experienced any port related delays in its execution of the deployment and redeployment of Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom troops and equipment. However, current congestion and the impact of anticipated trade growth on the exhausted and limited physical capacity of strategic ports may make it difficult for DOT to meet this performance measure in the future. A draft NPRN report nearing completion reviewed the strategic port system, military requirements, and readiness timelines. The report is expected to conclude that all the strategic ports are necessary to meet the national military objectives and provide operational flexibility and redundancy and that, based upon industry views and independent data, congestion and lack of port infrastructure will continue to challenge the strategic ports’ ability to meet both commercial and military surge requirements without commercial disruption. The NPRN draft report provided data to a DoD report that was requested by Congress after strategic ports expressed concerns about congestion and their future ability to meet military deployment requirements in a more congested transportation system. The expected completion date for the DoD report is October 2006. DOT will incorporate study findings into future planning and continue working with DoD to identify other possible solutions that better match requirements with availability at the individual port facilities.

FY 2007 Performance Forecast. DOT expects to meet the FY 2007 target. During FY 2007, MARAD will work with DoD and the industry to insure that every effort is made for clarifying and anticipating requirements to minimize the impact on commercial cargo flow while providing timely and sufficient port facilities for military deployments.

TRANSPORTATION READINESS FY 2006 ENACTED FUNDS $574.4 MILLION

The past year marked the busiest on record for the Office of Intelligence, Security, and Emergency Response. The response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma began late in FY 2005 and continued through FY 2006. These storms illustrated the importance of preparedness on a scale not previously experienced in domestic incident response. DOT, under Emergency Support Function (ESF) No. 1 of the National Response Plan, led the response for transportation and played a significant role in the response to these storms. Although the Department met the challenges these storms presented, their severity and the duration of the response stretched our resources to their limits. FY 2006 marked an incident-free year in domestic transportation security. However, several international terrorism threats and incidents prompted the implementation of targeted protective measures to ensure the security of the domestic transportation system. DOT’s role in identifying and helping to implement the most effective and efficient measures was reinforced and helped quickly close potential gaps as the threat environment changed.

2006 Results. In addition to responses to threats and emergencies, the Department measures internal preparedness using the Transportation Capability Assessment for Readiness (TCAR) score. It assesses six functional areas to obtain the overall TCAR score. These areas include monitoring operations, emergency response, training and exercises, continuity of operations, continuity of government, and international civil emergency planning. Although DOT met the target with a score of 72, expectations of all Federal departments and agencies involved in these activities have risen in the wake of the 2005 Hurricanes and are reflected in numerous White House and Congressional reports. The on-going challenges for Deparmental preparedness have risen significantly, with a few examples provided below:

• Operational Response (National Response Plan ESF-1): There has been an increase in demand for DOT to provide transportation services during emergencies. For example, in three successive years, emergency transportation support needs have risen from 700 truckloads of commodities moved in 2004 to over 23,000 truckloads during last year’s hurricane season. This increase was in addition to the major evacuation support described below. Although it is impossible to predict the severity of future natural or man-made disasters, it is clear that we must be prepared to respond effectively and efficiently to catastrophic events at any time.
• Evacuations: During Hurricane Katrina, DOT, through ESF-1, provided over 1,100 evacuation buses, arranged for an Amtrak evacuation train, and coordinated the air evacuation of over 24,000 residents from New Orleans. For the 2006 hurricane season, DOT, in support of the Department of Homeland Security has established major contracts for bus and passenger rail evacuation support to ensure the capability is in place to evacuate larger populations in the event of a catastrophic incident. DOT also refined an existing contract to improve access to commercial aviation services. DOT leads and staffs the Transportation Management Unit in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, which was established to conduct planning and response activities for Gulf Coast evacuations and emergencies this hurricane season. Although additional planning will be needed to evolve plans to assist other States with evacuations, these measures represent levels of evacuation planning and increased capacity in the Federal Government. Sustaining these capabilities and providing additional evacuation planning support will be critical to future preparedness.
• Continuing Role of the Office of Intelligence, Security, and Emergency Response: In addition to the increase in preparedness and operations responsibilities described above, the Department has ongoing obligations, which are summarized below;
  • Provide intelligence information and timely analysis of threats; and security, diplomatic, and economic issues that impact the Department’s ability to effectively perform its mission;
  • Monitor the status of the national transportation system from the Crisis Management Center (CMC), 24 hours a day, seven-days a week;
  • Develop and review preparedness and security policy;
  • Represent and prepare the Department for national and Senior Official level exercises and training required under the National Exercise Program and other directives;
  • Ensure the Department meets the requirements of Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government established by Executive Order. This includes development and maintenance of continuity plans, conducting training and maintaining an alternate site from which to conduct DOT operations; and,
  • Participate in international civil emergency planning for response to natural disasters and crises, including national security.

FY 2007 Performance Forecast. In 2007, the Department is planning to expand intelligence support to Operating Administrations, security policy development and preparedness and response operations. We anticipate meeting the performance target of 75 in FY 2007.