

Security

Background

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Twelve of the conference participants attended the Security Issue Session. Prior to the conference, each received a read-ahead paper describing the security issues within the Marine Transportation System (MTS) that were expressed by Regional Listening Session attendees and related studies. The issues from the Regional Listening Sessions addressed security in the context of criminal activity, terrorism and military mobilization.

Crime: The post Cold War era has been marked by an explosive rise in international organized criminal activity. Drug and migrant traffickers, illicit arms merchants, money launderers, counterfeiters, and contraband smugglers of every ilk are exploiting newly opened borders, liberalized markets, and fragile government institutions to forge global networks to conduct their nefarious activities. The maritime sector is especially vulnerable since its scale, complexity, and pace of activity often overwhelm local, state, and federal enforcement capabilities. Additionally, criminals are not just attracted to the sea and ports as mediums for their smuggling operations—more and more they are after the cargoes as well.

Terrorism: In addition to the surge in international crime, the passing of the Cold War has left in its wake a growing array of rogue states and terrorists. These states and transnational adversaries appear intent on undermining the global forces of integration and the economic and political structures that advance America's interests and values. They likely will avoid directly challenging U.S. forces on the land, sea, or air. Instead, they will take their battles to the "street." The critical infrastructure, including the transportation and communications networks that underpin America's economic power, are likely targets. When its importance is combined with its inherent vulnerability, the nation's Marine Transportation System may deserve premiere billing as America's "Achilles' heel." Too, the burgeoning cruise and ferry ship industry presents a potent terrorist opportunity for those who are intent on advancing their cause through publicity or by extracting concessions from national governments by holding their citizens hostage.

Mobilization: Force projection and crisis response capabilities that underpin U.S. engagement increasingly depend upon commercial shipping to support its sealift requirements. This has been reinforced by the closure of many overseas bases over the past decade. Since the overwhelming majority of materials to sustain overseas operations need to move by sea, the logistical backbone for the rapid loading and transport of American forces and material relies ultimately upon the marine transportation infrastructure. Current sealift plans aim for commercial shippers to support 95 percent of the armed services logistics requirements in peacetime and 90 percent in time of war. At the same time, commercial shipping is increasingly (1) moving offshore to ports such as Vancouver, Halifax, and Freeport; and (2) relying upon larger, deeper draft ships designed for specific cargo, and dependent upon technically sophisticated, highly specialized shoreside facilities for loading and offloading. There is substantial risk of divergence between DOD commercial sealift requirements and the marine industry

capabilities. Finally, enemies incapable of winning direct military engagements will opt to try to thwart or at least disrupt the mobilization of our forces and their resupply by targeting the vulnerabilities at critical node points in our Marine Transportation System.

The participants in the security issue session were presented with two scenarios: one focused on the organized crime control challenge; the other dealt with a hypothetical terrorism threat designed to disrupt sealift operations. The objective of the scenarios was to provide a baseline for the subsequent discussions to develop: (1) the scope and significance of the maritime security challenge; (2) the barriers to successfully responding to that challenge, and (3) the best action plan for overcoming these barriers. Following the scenarios, the participants, through a facilitated discussion, crafted answers to the following questions in preparation for their report-out to all the conference participants:

- ◆ What are the most critical security threats connected with the Marine Transportation System?
- ◆ How can the dissemination of threat information, particularly to commercial users, be improved?
- ◆ What actions should be taken for reducing unauthorized access and improving the tracking and examination of goods and people within the marine industry? How can these actions be optimally aligned with the security measures for the air and surface transportation modes? What is an appropriate time scale for taking these actions?
- ◆ What actions should be taken to ensure that essential improvement to the commercial maritime infrastructure can also continue to meet U.S. national mobilization requirements?
- ◆ What incentives and pressures can be brought to bear for advancing improved port, vessel, and passenger security worldwide?
- ◆ What roles and responsibilities should be assigned to the private and public sectors to strengthen national and international resolve and capabilities for combating crime and terrorism in the maritime sector, and for addressing growing sea-based mobilization requirements?
- ◆ What is the most appropriate mechanism to ensure sustained private-public commitment and leadership on these security issues?

Outcomes

After conducting a security vulnerability assessment using the two scenario-based exercises, and further refining and developing the problems and challenges to MTS security, the session participants began reviewing and modifying the draft MTS vision document. The security aspects of the vision are contained in Section D —General System-Wide Attributes: Security. The Group reached consensus on the general security attributes that the system should include. They are:

The MTS in 2020 will support (1) national security efforts to ensure quick and efficient response to natural disasters and contingency operations, and (2) law enforcement efforts to prevent drug trafficking, cargo theft, auto theft, illegal immigration, and other criminal activities. The following security attributes apply:

- ◆ Critical infrastructure is designed and operated to prevent and/or mitigate system disruptions due to natural and man made disasters.
- ◆ System approach for rapid restoration of transportation system services disrupted by natural or manmade disasters.
- ◆ Assured/uninterrupted capability to deploy forces and material in support of national security operations.
- ◆ In transit visibility of maritime cargo and personnel transportation operations, which support detection and deterrence of smuggling, cargo theft, tariff evasion, and potential acts of violence.
- ◆ Mechanisms will be in place that allow for the timely sharing of intelligence information on potential smuggling and terrorist activities to law enforcement agencies and port authorities security forces.
- ◆ Security measures are integral to the design and operations so as to protect the public and minimize impact to user. Security requirements are balanced with requirements of cost effective operations.

In development of the goals and recommended actions, the group identified numerous areas of concern and themes that guided their work. They revised these and built upon the information presented in the read-ahead paper to focus their efforts. Some examples of these areas of concern include:

- ◆ Insufficient public awareness exists of the growing vulnerability of the MTS to, or the extent of the disruptive costs, as a result of, terrorist and asymmetric attack and exploitation by organized crime.
- ◆ Enhancing MTS security will require a systemic approach and integrated federal leadership.

- ◆ Any response to security threats will require robust engagement of the private sector.
- ◆ Minimum security standards and operating procedures are lacking both domestically and internationally for MTS.
- ◆ Deterring the targeting and exploitation of MTS will require closer monitoring of what moves through the system.

The participants worked in smaller groups to address the issues and develop goals with recommended actions, then regrouped to refine the products. They presented their work in plenary to all the conference participants and made modifications based on the feedback. The security issue team believed this was probably the least understood issue for the majority of conference participants but one of significant national importance. The presentation was delivered by Mr. William Lucas, Deputy to the Commander, U.S. Military Traffic Management Command.

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<p>ISSUE—a description of the issue area of discussion starting with the issue title.</p>	<p>ISSUE: THERE IS INSUFFICIENT NATIONAL SECURITY AWARENESS OF MTS AS A KEY ELEMENT OF U.S. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE</p>
<p>GOAL—provide a brief description of the specific outcome for the year 2020 which describes a certain action (e.g., increase, maintain, reduce, etc.) within a broad area covered by the issue.</p>	<p>GOAL 1: THE GENERAL PUBLIC; PRIVATE SECTOR; AND LOCAL, STATE, AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES UNDERSTAND AND VALUE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MTS TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS</p>

	RECOMMENDED ACTIONS	Recommended Lead	Time Frame
A	Establish a Presidential or Congressionally mandated Commission on ports and waterways security.	Public-Private Partnership	M
B	Stage terrorist attack exercises directed against the MTS operations and critical infrastructure.	Public-Private Partnership	M
C	Ensure that private and public educational efforts designed to highlight the value of MTS also include the message: “MTS is indispensable to our national security interests; i.e., economic, military mobilization, health and well-being.”	Public-Private Partnership	S

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<p>ISSUE—a description of the issue area of discussion starting with the issue title.</p>	<p>ISSUE: MARKET-DRIVEN FORCES COULD COMPROMISE THE INFRASTRUCTURE & OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES REQUIRED FOR QUICK, SECURE, & EFFICIENT MOBILIZATION FOR ALL TYPES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS</p>
<p>GOAL—provide a brief description of the specific outcome for the year 2020 which describes a certain action (e.g., increase, maintain, reduce, etc.) within a broad area covered by the issue.</p>	<p>GOAL 2: ASSURE THE AVAILABILITY AND SECURITY OF MTS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS</p>

	RECOMMENDED ACTIONS	Recommended Lead	Time Frame
A	Promote U.S. shippers and government agencies to use flag vessels.	Public: Federal Private: Various Shipper Organizations	M
B	Promote MTS security improvements that facilitate military deployment and mobilization.	Public: Federal	M
C	Develop real-time, dynamic modeling of MTS disruptions--cargo congestion, natural disaster or terrorist activity. Include in modeling alternative courses of action and cost impacts.	Public-Private Partnership	S
D	Conduct periodic reviews of infrastructure, including modal connections/capabilities, necessary to assure port access and ship operations.	Public-Private Partnership	S
E	Conduct baseline and periodic vulnerability assessments to determine state of readiness for military loadout facilities and their support MTS infrastructure.	DOT/DOD	S

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<p>ISSUE—a description of the issue area of discussion starting with the issue title.</p>	<p>ISSUE: THERE IS A LACK OF INTEGRATED FEDERAL LEADERSHIP OF MTS SECURITY ISSUES</p>
<p>GOAL—provide a brief description of the specific outcome for the year 2020 which describes a certain action (e.g., increase, maintain, reduce, etc.) within a broad area covered by the issue.</p>	<p>GOAL 3: DESIGNATE A FEDERAL LEAD AGENCY WITH STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR COORDINATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, MTS INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY, AND RESPONSE</p>

	RECOMMENDED ACTIONS	Recommended Lead	Time Frame
A	Designate a federal lead agency with statutory authority to be responsible and accountable for coordination of law enforcement, MTS infrastructure security, and response.	DOT	S

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<p>ISSUE—a description of the issue area of discussion starting with the issue title.</p>	<p>ISSUE: THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES DIRECTED TOWARD DETECTING, INTERCEPTING, AND RESPONDING TO CONSEQUENCES OF ACTS OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM</p>
<p>GOAL—provide a brief description of the specific outcome for the year 2020 which describes a certain action (e.g., increase, maintain, reduce, etc.) within a broad area covered by the issue.</p>	<p>GOAL 4: TO HAVE SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO DETECT, PREVENT, AND RESPOND TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF MOVEMENTS OF CONTRABAND, THEFT, ILLEGAL MIGRANTS, AND OTHER CRIMINAL OR TERRORISTS ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE MTS SYSTEM WHILE MAINTAINING UNINTERRUPTED COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS</p>

	RECOMMENDED ACTIONS	Recommended Lead	Time Frame
A	Develop and integrate real time intelligent system for tracking cargo, personnel, and vessel operations throughout MTS.	Public-Private partnership	M
B	Establish public/private partnerships to implement incentive-based mechanisms to address MTS security vulnerabilities.	Public-Private Partnership	M
C	Conduct baseline assessment of available public and private capabilities to support (1) the interception of MTS criminal and terrorist activities, and (2) to respond to the consequences of terrorists acts within MTS.	Public-Private Partnership	S
D	Designate a lead federal agency to coordinate at the local port and waterway level: (1) the interception of MTS criminal and terrorist activities and (2) the response to the consequences of terrorists acts within MTS.	Federal	S

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ISSUE —a description of the issue area of discussion starting with the issue title.	ISSUE: THERE ARE NO ESTABLISHED MINIMUM MTS SECURITY STANDARDS AND OPERATING GUIDELINES
GOAL —provide a brief description of the specific outcome for the year 2020 which describes a certain action (e.g., increase, maintain, reduce, etc.) within a broad area covered by the issue.	GOAL 5: DESIGNATE A FEDERAL LEAD AGENCY WITH STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF MINIMUM MTS SECURITY STANDARDS AND OPERATING GUIDELINES

	RECOMMENDED ACTIONS	Recommended Lead	Time Frame
A	Develop a strategy and process for establishing operating guidelines and minimum security standards to govern day-to-day operations for onshore facilities, offshore facilities, and vessels. Participants must include federal, state, local, and private sector representatives.	Public-Private Partnership (DOT Lead)	S
B	Develop and implement minimum MTS security standards to include a mechanism for establishing and monitoring performance measures to gauge effectiveness and aid in refinement.	Public-Private Partnership	M
C	Promote adaptation and refinement of operating guidelines at the local port and waterway level.	Federal	M
D	Develop a strategy and process for advancing U.S. national MTS operating guidelines and minimum security standards on an international basis.	Public-Private Partnership	L