WHITE HOUSE COMMSSION ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY
THE DOT STATUS REPORT

3. Improving Security for Travelers

3.1--The federal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, and provide substantial funding for capital improvements.

• The President recognized aviation security as a major element of our strategy against terrorism, and then sought funding for the deployment of advanced security equipment. The Congress did its part by passing two important laws authorizing and funding the initial recommendations: the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act signed by the President on September 30, and the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act signed October 9, 1996.

• By the end of October 1996, FAA had formed a team of acquisition and security experts from government, airport authorities and air carriers to plan, purchase and install explosives detection devices and other advanced security equipment at many of the busiest U.S. airports. Continued federal funding at a minimum level of $100 million a year for several years is necessary to efficiently continue capital improvements that are more fully described under recommendations 3.15 and 3.20. To continue this effort the FAA is requesting $100 million in funding in FY 1999.

3.2--The FAA should establish federally mandated standards for security enhancements.

• Standards for the certification and use of equipment, and the training and performance of security personnel are an integral part of improvements required by many other recommendations. The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-604) states that prior to a requirement for deployment of explosives detection systems (EDS), the FAA must certify that EDS performance meets standards based upon the amount and types of explosives likely to be used to cause catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft, derived from test results using independently developed test protocols. The Act further requires that certified equipment must be able to detect such amounts under realistic air carrier operating conditions. All of this has been done.

• In November 1992, FAA issued the draft EDS standard and the National Academy of Sciences completed final certification test protocols in May 1993. FAA developed coordinated standards with the scientific and intelligence communities, the aviation industry, and properly cleared manufacturers and vendors, then published final unclassified portions on September 10, 1993. In December 1994, the InVision CTX-5000 was certified as the first, and so far the only, explosives detection system. In addition, a proposal was published in August 1996 to amend existing standards for FAA certification of explosives detection systems to detect detonators as well as bulk explosives. The proposal’s comment period closed on January 6, 1997, comments have been analyzed, and a draft final standard is being prepared.

• Operational procedures for trace detection equipment have been developed and are being applied in the field as part of the deployment of the equipment under recommendations 3.1 and 3.15. Trace detection performance criteria standards for the amounts and types of explosives to be detected are under development.

• Training is more fully covered under recommendations 3.10, 3.20 and 3.30.

3.3--The Postal Service should advise customers that all packages weighing over 16 ounces will be subject to examination for explosives and other threat objects in order to move by air.

• The United States Postal Service (USPS) has reviewed recommendations 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 and is very concerned about the potential impacts of the recommendations. If implemented, they would seriously impede USPS ability to provide timely, reliable, low cost mail service to both domestic and international customers. Also, full implementation will impede USPS capability to compete with other companies who are not subject to the same stringent screening requirements as proposed for the USPS. The slow throughput rates of currently certified explosives detection systems make their application impractical for screening large volumes of mail. Regarding the legal issues, legislation would be required to implement recommendation 3.3.

• Aside from the need for legislative authority to intrude into mail that is sealed against inspection, the USPS remains concerned as to how it would implement the screening of parcels weighing 16 ounces or more. The FAA-certified explosives detection system was designed for screening checked bags with an appropriate system throughput for that purpose. It was not designed or certified to process over 1 million pounds of parcels per day weighing 16 ounces or more that fly in passenger aircraft. The USPS fears that screening mail as provided for in the recommendation may not be feasible without extensive delay of the mail. To minimize delays and ensure effective screening, the USPS would have to acquire a large number of these systems whose total acquisition and operational cost is estimated to exceed one billion dollars, immediately translating into higher postal rates for customers.

• The USPS 's Aviation Mail Security Committee continues to examine the current and emerging technologies to determine their potential application in postal operations. Further, the Committee will soon visit European Postal Administrations, who are screening mail, to learn if any of the technologies and procedures used by them can be adapted to USPS operations. Thus far, a system with characteristics that would be required for deployment in the U.S. postal operating environment has not been found.

• The USPS does not believe the public would, in the interest of enhancing aviation security, understand and accept the need to relax the sanctity and privacy of the mail and Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless search. The USPS strongly doubts that the public will accept such routine intrusion into the mail by government agencies to detect items in which they may be interested. The USPS believes this kind of activity would be strongly contested in any public hearings held by Congress.

3.4--Current law should be amended to clarify the U.S. Customs Service's authority to search outbound international mail.

• U.S. Customs has proposed a legislative change to amend Title 19, clarifying outbound search authority. Key legislative staffs on both the House and Senate Banking Committees have been briefed and have expressed support. Close coordination between U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Postal Service personnel will be essential to avoid duplicative efforts.

• The Postal Service continues to take exception to this recommendation, and has held meetings with the General Accounting Office, Office of Management and Budget, and Customs. It contends this recommendation would adversely affect its ability to provide timely, low cost service and would be a waste of money due to duplication of efforts recommended under 3.3. The Postal Service believes giving Customs the authority to inspect outbound international mail is not legal and in any case would not be operationally practical or efficient.

3.5--The FAA should implement a comprehensive plan to address the threat of explosives and other threat objects in cargo and work with industry to develop new initiatives in this area.

• Perhaps more than in any other aspect of security, the need for new partnerships in exploring innovative improvements in cargo security were obvious to the Commission immediately. Advice from the Aviation Security Advisory Committee Baseline Working Group, which needed to form a cargo subgroup to deal with this complicated problem, made that clear.

• To implement this recommendation, FAA proposed amendments to standard security programs for U.S. carriers, couriers, freight forwarders and cargo consolidators, as well as the model security program for foreign air carriers. These proposals were issued for comment on May 14, 1997. Changes to the voluntary, "domestic security integrated program" for all cargo carriers were also proposed. Since that time, FAA listening sessions have been held, and major substantive recommendations to clarify further the intent of cargo acceptance and handling procedures have been made by several groups.

• The Cargo Baseline Working Group recommended that the proposed amendments be rewritten. Comments made at listening sessions on June 3 and July 28, 1997, in addition to written comments received from the industry prompted reexamination of the proposed amendments, and a completely rewritten version. Several major changes are being proposed, particularly regarding "known" versus "unknown" shipper criteria and specific cargo screening procedures. The proposed amendments will be published for comment this year.

3.6--The FAA should establish a security system that will provide a high level of protection for all aviation information systems.

• Information security is important not only to comply with this recommendation but also with the recommendations of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). As the National Airspace System evolves from a custom-made, highly specialized array of equipment and services, to a more open system comprised of commercial off-the-shelf products and services the planned information security system will more effectively protect air traffic control information and systems from the increasing risk of "information-based attacks," an area of special concern to the PCCIP. GAO is currently circulating a report on FAA's air traffic control computer security. The Department is preparing comments, and will use the final report to help improve information security. GAO is circulating a report on FAA's air traffic control computer security. The Department is preparing comments, and will use the final report to help improve physical and information security.

• FAA is planning on FY98 funding of $3.2 million and FY99 funding of $27.1 million for its information security program. FAA’s information security initiative will combine efficient system development and operations with sound security risk management policy and procedures throughout the life cycle of new and existing automated air traffic systems. It will work hand-in-hand with improvements in the physical security of critical FAA facilities, such as air route traffic control centers and airport control towers.

3.7--The FAA should work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure that all passengers are positively identified and subjected to security procedures before they board aircraft.

• FAA continues to work with airlines and airport operators to ensure that all passengers are effectively screened prior to boarding. The initial proposed amendment to the air carrier standard security program addressing Commission concerns was issued for comment to regulated parties on March 28, 1997. The proposal included: revised procedures for applying a computer assisted or manual passenger screening system for all flights originating in the United States; clearance procedures for selectee bags, articles and suspicious items, including a provision for the use of explosives detection systems and devices; air carrier self-auditing of screening checkpoint operations; and, checked baggage acceptance operations.

• Comments were received, analyzed and a revised proposal was issued on August 5, 1997. Airlines requested and were granted an extension of the comment period until October 10, 1997. Running in parallel, a related proposal to amend the air carrier standard security program was issued for comment in December 1997 with a comment period closing January 31, 1998. In general, the proposal modifies the August 1997 clearance procedures for selectee bags; and incorporates an additional random selection percentage for those air carriers applying the "manual" passenger screening. A final amendment to the air carrier standard security program will not be issued until its contents are carefully reviewed and fully coordinated with initiatives detailed here and under recommendations 3.15, 3.19 and 3.24.

3.8--Submit a proposed resolution, through the U.S. Representative, that the International Civil Aviation Organization begin a program to verify and improve compliance with international security standards.

• The U.S. mission to ICAO made a proposal to ICAO regarding enhancements to the ICAO Security mechanism. The ICAO Council considered the issue at its June 4, 1997 meeting and decided to table it and discuss it at the last session of the Council in the fall of 1997. Currently, the resolution has not been adopted. The U.S. mission will continue to pursue the proposal.

3.9-- Assess the possible use of chemical and biological weapons as tools of terrorism.

• The FAA works closely with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and other federal agencies to ensure awareness of the plans and activities of other organizations assessing the use of chemical and biological agents by terrorist groups. For example, FAA knows that local airport authorities have been involved and many of them have scheduled "first responder training" for their fire and police departments to increase the awareness of problems associated with the use of chemical and biological agents.

• In general, aviation security planning and specific security measures are based, among other things, on assessments from law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Threat assessment and coordinated planning for prevention as well as research and development has been continuous since required by the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990.

3.10--The FAA should work with industry to develop a national program to increase the professionalism of the aviation security workforce, including screening personnel.

• The FAA continues to take human factors into account by providing appropriate training, and developing utilization tandards, clear guidance and operational procedures in partnership with the airlines to ensure the effective use of security equipment by trained and properly motivated air carrier personnel. FAA is also taking steps to improve initial and recurrent training curricula for both checkpoint supervisors and screeners.

• The Supervisory Effectiveness Training program provides screening supervisors and managers with the basic skills necessary to properly control the day-to-day operations under their charge. The program would establish standards for training to provide such essential skills as interpersonal relations, conflict resolution, leadership, and performance improvement.

• The FAA and airlines are deploying elements of the Screener Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting System (SPEARS), a major FAA effort to improve training and monitor screener effectiveness. SPEARS has computer-based training modules, which are effective and efficient methods for training screeners. Training systems for screeners using x-ray machines at security checkpoints have been installed at 17 major airports. They will soon be available for explosives detection systems and trace detection devices.

• The other SPEARS component, Threat Image Projection (TIP), is a system whereby artificial images of improvised explosives devices and other threat objects are presented to the screener during the performance of normal duties as if objects actually were in baggage. The screener’s decisions are tabulated and recorded to furnish real-time feedback for effectiveness monitoring and as a training tool. Approximately 300 TIP systems are being deployed to the 19 busiest airports. Deployment should be completed this summer. We expect air carriers who helped FAA develop this equipment will embrace its deployment as full partners and ensure its effective use. See also 3.20.

3.11--Access to airport controlled areas must be secured and the physical security of aircraft must be ensured.

• Revision of the basic code of federal regulations for airport and air carrier security, published in the Federal Register on August 1, 1997, will include strengthening access controls and aircraft security. Research has begun on more efficient and effective use of existing perimeter and sensitive area surveillance systems. The FAA is conducting research on radio frequency identification tags that could possibly assist in tracking checked baggage movement in secure areas of the airport.

3.12--Establish consortia at all commercial airports to implement enhancements to aviation safety and security.

• In September 1996, immediately after the Commission’s initial recommendations were announced, the FAA established consortia at 41 major U.S. airports--our busiest airports. The FAA, the airline industry and other agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) have used consortia to find and fix problems cooperatively. By mid-December 1996, these consortia completed vulnerability assessments and submitted action plans with recommended procedural changes and specific needs for advanced security technology identified. To increase their effectiveness and numbers as recommended by the Commission, FAA will soon issue an advisory circular containing a revised voluntary disclosure policy that encourages people to come forward, reveal problems and fix them. Voluntary security consortia will be expanded to 200 airports by the end of 1998.

• BATF agents are visiting all major airports to offer assistance in conducting explosives threat assessments and other vulnerability assessments relating to explosives.

3.13--Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop action plans.

• The FAA has contracted with several private sector firms, including one that participated in the development of the model used by Sandia National Laboratory, to conduct several vulnerability assessments supported by onsite FAA agents, using various models and methodologies. FAA is using several vulnerability assessment models to determine which is really the best and most appropriate for use at airports.

• Eight contractors have been assigned to assess 14 major airports. The planning stage has been completed, and teams at 6 airports have completed onsite data collection activities. Fourteen out of 28 volunteer candidate airports will be engaged in helping to test and evaluate the models used in these assessments. Final analysis will begin in March 1998, and all 14-airport assessments will be completed by August. A panel of experts will be used to evaluate the results of these assessments, and to develop guidelines for future airport vulnerability assessment in terms of best methodologies and tools to be used. Additional funding planned for FY99 and beyond will be used to continue assessments at other major airports. The final award will go to the contractor(s) determined to provide the most cost effective assessment process.

• The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 includes a requirement for FAA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct joint threat and vulnerability assessments of airports designated as high risk. In order to fulfill this requirement, FAA has been working closely with the FBI to develop a methodology for these assessments. The model relies on a national-level threat assessment of selected U.S. airports, conducted by the FBI at a Headquarters level, and a local, criminal threat assessment conducted by the appropriate Bureau field office. Concurrently, the FAA will conduct a comprehensive vulnerability assessment and a validation of the result. FAA plans to utilize the information gathered in a relational database to identify and relate key vulnerability issues and assign threat factors for all airports throughout the United States.

• The FBI and FAA conducted a joint assessment at Baltimore-Washington International Airport in December 1997. A validation of the assessment questionnaire was performed and the FBI provided an analysis of the trends in criminal activity at the airport. Washington-Dulles International Airport was assessed in January 1998, and beginning in February, two airports per month will be jointly assessed.

3.14--Require criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint checks for all screeners and all airport and airline employees with access to secure areas.

• Perhaps more than any other single security issue, background checks have been discussed and debated in great detail for nearly 15 years, largely because of the need to proceed cautiously to insure the protection of individual rights to privacy so strongly prized by Americans. Each incremental step toward greater authority to review an individual’s background prior to granting access to restricted areas of airports has been taken only after close examination and careful consideration of all viewpoints. The FAA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on March 19, 1997, to extend background check regulations to include screeners. The comment period closed on May 19, 1997. Analysis of comments received and the drafting of the final rule is being conducted in the context of other initiatives on passenger screening, with publication planned for this year. Full implementation of the Commission recommendation, however, would require additional legislation to further extend application of criminal history record checks.

• The FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services Complex in Clarksburg, W. Va., is processing fingerprint examples submitted by the FAA pursuant to Federal Regulation. The FBI has cut turnaround time in half. Approximately 20,000 fingerprint cards have been or are in process. Full implementation of this recommendation is also dependent upon FBI fingerprint turnaround time and deployment of the automated Electronic Fingerprint Image Print Server (EFIPS). The goal is to deploy technology that will be fully operational by mid-1999 and reduce turnaround time to 2-3 days and eventually only 24 hours.

3.15--Deploy existing technology.

• As required by recommendation 3.1 and in the spirit of partnership for enhancing security endorsed by the Commission, the federal government is funding air carrier security improvements by subsidizing the capital expenses of the air carriers, including some training and installation costs, through the purchase of advanced security equipment. The air carriers’ role in this partnership is to use the equipment purchased effectively and pay for its operation and maintenance after one year. The President’s FY99 budget contains $100 million for continued federal funding and deployment of all types of advanced security technologies.

• In December 1996, FAA purchased 54 certified explosives detection systems for screening checked baggage, using a portion of $144 million for equipment provided by Congress in the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997. The joint government and industry integrated product team described under 3.1 began installation of the equipment in Chicago and New York in January 1997 and will continue deploying these devices through FY98 with current funds. Certified explosives detection systems are operational in six cities with deployment to several more cities planned for the spring of 1998.

• The use of trace explosives' detection devices at screening checkpoints began in November 1996. Since then, additional trace devices were deployed to 18 airports in FY97. More have been sent to 14 other airports so far this fiscal year. A total of 128 devices are in place and being used to provide better security and deterrence. Over 60 more will be purchased and installed at dozens of additional checkpoints and in many more airports during 1998. As specifically recommended by the Commission, 18 advanced automated x-ray devices and 4 other advanced technology devices have also been purchased for FY98 deployment to achieve the broadest possible mix of effective technologies in airports.

3.16--Establish a joint government-industry research and development program. The FAA is encouraged to use the best available technology to solve security and safety challenges throughout the air transportation system.

• In response to a requirement in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, an agreement to create a National Academy of Sciences Panel on Assessment of Technologies for Aviation Security was signed by FAA and the Academy on May 19, 1997. The panel's statements of work and membership have been approved. It will assess the results of the advanced security equipment deployments, hardened cargo container tests and planned deployments, and then recommend how to more effectively deploy explosives' detection systems and hardened containers to improve security. The first panel meeting was held on January 29, 1998.

3.17--Establish an interagency task force to assess the potential use of surface-to-air missiles against commercial aircraft.

• In 1992, the FAA convened an Off Site Threat Working Group to examine this threat. The group has conducted tests to develop target acquisition capabilities using simulators and resources provided by the Department of Defense. The FAA is developing exercises to evaluate the effectiveness of existing policies and procedures to counter and manage such a threat to civil aviation.

• The Commission recommended the creation of an interagency effort headed by the Department of Defense to evaluate the risk posed by surface-to-air missiles to civil aviation. The DOT is directly involved in the Civil Aviation Anti-Missile Defense Task Force. Besides DOD and DOT, the Task Force also includes representatives from the State Department and the FBI. The Task Force's objective is to develop a plan to identify security procedures for use in managing, countering, and resolving man-portable surface-to-air missile threat at all major airports in the United States. The Task Force has formed three working groups: aircraft protection; civil aviation protection (including threat reaction planning); and international agreements.

3.18--Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs.

• The canine explosives detection team concept has been an important part of aviation security strategy for many years. FAA and operators of nearly 40 of the largest airports have signed a comprehensive, cooperative agreement on canine explosives detection teams. It asks airport authorities to place more teams on-site to screen suspicious bags, packages and cargo, and to search airliners and terminals after bomb threats. The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 provided $8.9 million for reimbursement to airports that signed the agreement to cover specified direct costs up to specific limits.

• In one of many interagency partnerships, the FAA and the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) signed an agreement last year outlining the principles governing a joint research pilot project. They then began the project, using one FAA certified trained dog and handler team and one BATF certified trained dog and handler team working in parallel with each team combining with a Washington Metropolitan Airport Authority officer. Teams are composed of two dogs per team. Protocols to govern testing and other procedures are being formulated to make sure the teams can reliably detect explosives and to develop information concerning the merits of the different training approaches from the standpoint of the operational use of such teams.

• Separately, BATF is expanding its explosives detection canine program infrastructure at Front Royal, Virginia, to train additional canines for various customers and applications. An Odor Proficiency Standard was published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1998. BATF is working with FAA and a number of other federal agencies to develop and refine this basic odor recognition standard for use by various agencies in evaluating canines throughout the United States. Odor Proficiency Standards were published in the January 19, 1998 Federal Register and are still being refined.

• During 1997, the FAA trained 54 handlers and 60 dogs. The first "FAA exclusive" class of K-9 handlers graduated from the Military Working Dog School at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas on March 25, 1997. The most recent class began on January 8, 1998 with three more classes scheduled this year in a program that can produce up to 52 handlers per year. FAA expanded the program from 87 canine explosives detection teams in 1996 to 130 teams at 38 airports across the country so far this year. As program expansion continues, by the end of 1998, there will be about 154 teams at approximately 40 airports.

• The program remains voluntary on the part of airports. Those not in the current program are unlikely to join without adequate cost sharing by the federal government. Future growth is therefore a function of available funding.

3.19--Complement technology with automated passenger profiling.

• One of the greatest success stories in implementing Commission recommendations is the cooperative effort to produce and deploy an effective automated passenger profiling system without compromising individual civil liberties.

• By mid-1996, FAA, through a grant to Northwest Airlines, had developed a prototype automated passenger profiling system known as Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening or CAPS. In September 1996, a follow-on grant was awarded to Northwest both to refine the program to achieve operational capability and to assist in adapting CAPS to other airlines’ reservation systems. Northwest met with other air carriers in the fall, conducted preliminary system tests during the winter, and progressed to operational tests on selected flights in its system in April 1997. Northwest has completed the process of phasing in CAPS throughout its domestic system with over 150 stations on-line today.

• American, Continental, US Airways, Delta, TWA, and United Airlines, covering all major reservation systems, began work on developing their CAPS systems in May 1997. On February 5, 1998, United Airlines implemented CAPS at all 225 of its domestic stations (including United Express). Some other carriers have begun field-testing CAPS. FAA is helping fund these efforts through cooperative agreements, which will disburse to the carriers funding appropriated by Congress for CAPS.

• It is anticipated that all major carriers will have phased in CAPS voluntarily before new federal regulation mandates its use as the method of determining which passengers’ bags must be subjected to additional security measures, such as bag matching or screening with explosives detection systems. As the use of CAPS expands, security improves, since CAPS offers numerous advantages over its manual alternative, including greater sophistication, speed, protection against the compromise of sensitive security information, and objectivity.

• The Departments of Transportation and Justice are sensitive to public concerns about the potential for discriminatory treatment whenever a process is in place that results in more rigorous security measures applied to some passengers than to others. Great care has been taken to ensure that CAPS does not infringe civil liberties. In accordance with a recommendation of the Commission, DOT submitted the profiling elements to the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division for review. On October 1, 1997, the Department of Justice issued its report, which found that CAPS: (1) "fully complies with the equal protection guarantee incorporated in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution"; (2) "does not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures"; and (3) "does not involve any invasion of passengers’ personal privacy."

3.20--Certify screening companies and improve screener performance.

• To begin the regulatory process required by law, the FAA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on March 17, 1997, to solicit comments on certification of screening companies and other particular issues. The comment period closed on May 1, 1997, and FAA received and reviewed 20 substantive comments. After careful coordination with other efforts to improve security through implementation of these recommendations, the next step is publication in the Federal Register of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, scheduled for April 1998, followed by a final rule.

• The draft rule proposes to certificate all companies conducting aviation screening, carriers that conduct their own screening, and indirect air carriers that choose to conduct their own cargo screening. Other screening improvements being proposed include establishing management and instructor qualification and training standards, implementing screening company quality assurance and testing programs, and improving the professionalism of screener training programs.

• FAA continues to provide appropriate training, and to develop utilization standards, clear guidance, and operational procedures in partnership with the airlines to ensure the effective use of equipment by trained and properly motivated air carrier personnel. FAA is also taking steps to improve initial and recurrent training curricula for both checkpoint supervisors and screeners in addition to the certification rulemaking.

• The Supervisory Effectiveness Training (SET) program intends to provides screening supervisors and managers with basic skills necessary to properly control day-to-day operations. The program will establish standards for training such essential skills as interpersonal relations, conflict resolution, leadership, and performance improvement.

• The FAA developed the Screener Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting System (SPEARS) that can help train air carrier screeners through computer-based training and maintain their operational proficiency by projecting the images of dangerous articles on the x-ray monitor during the screening process. It can then track how often the screener correctly detects the projected threat.

• Computer based training systems for checkpoint screeners have been deployed and are now operational at 17 major airports with two more coming on-line soon and additional airport installations planned for this year. They are also available for explosives detection systems. The threat image projection component for conventional x-ray devices and explosives detection systems are also being deployed, as noted under recommendation 3.10.

3.21--Aggressively test existing security systems.

• Since 1991, FAA has used increasingly more realistic tests of security measures, such as those designed to control access, prevent unknown shipments from getting on airplanes, and screen passengers and their bags. Comprehensive and specific procedures for inspecting security systems have been developed. Using a combination of these procedures, including unannounced testing, surveillance, interviews and surprise record reviews, security systems will continue to be aggressively evaluated.

• FAA is steadily increasing the number of its field inspectors and their direct support personnel---119 of the 300 security personnel authorized by Congress in 1996 were brought on board in FY97. They will be focusing not only on doing more comprehensive fieldwork, but also on aggressively testing security systems. This testing can be done in two ways. First, field agents unknown to air carrier and airport security personnel simulate attacks based on standard protocols, and brief the results immediately to screeners and others so they can learn on-the-spot. Second, tests can also be classic "red team" tests in which, except in extreme cases, results are withheld and briefed later to the industry so that a more complete picture of total security system performance can be obtained.

• Red Teams, which are also being increased, started in 1991. Aggressive testing by field agents began in 1995 with tests to determine how well the industry was applying the required profile and conducting baggage searches. With the new resources being provided by Congress and the Administration, tests have already been expanded to the screening of small cargo packages, the matching of passengers and bags, and the screening of passengers and their carry-on items. Literally thousands of tests have been done at screening checkpoints, for example. More types of testing will soon take place, including indirect air carriers, and compliance with background check requirements. FAA is also requiring the airlines and the airports to test their own systems and report the results to the FAA.

• All testing is used to improve performance and achieve compliance. Where performance is only marginally deficient, FAA prefers to use the power of information in a working partnership with industry. But where there are significant problems with critical security systems, FAA will take much more immediate action, hopefully in partnership, but if not, then by using the full force of its enforcement authority.

3.22--Use the Customs Service to enhance security.

• The U.S. Customs Service is deploying 140 positions authorized under anti-terrorism legislation: 100 inspectors, 6 intelligence analysts, 33 special agents, and 1 technical support position. All positions were deployed to major international airports to assist aviation security efforts and to perform increased searches of passengers, baggage, and cargo departing the United States. In addition, analysts and investigators will work with the FBI at its airport offices and Headquarters Counter Terrorism Center to provide specific expertise to anti-terrorism investigations. The Office of Field Operations has developed a national Anti-terrorism/Aviation Safety and Security training program for the 100 inspectors that will begin at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in the spring of 1998. The Customs Service is in the process of evaluating, selecting, and deploying high technology equipment such as mobile baggage and cargo x-ray units. FAA and Customs Service are studying the technical issues associated with converting Customs' Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is designed for contraband analysis in marine cargo. It may be possible to adapt it for antiterrorism purposes in air cargo.

• Customs equipment deployment plans for FY98 and beyond includes:

  • 24 mobile x-ray vans [with radiation/explosives/drug detection capabilities] are scheduled to be delivered by July 1998. Seven additional vans to be purchased in FY98.

  • Delivery in August of 11 portable x-ray systems and explosives/drug detectors [cart mounted] for mail and courier use.

• 675 out of 1700 radiation pagers will be delivered to the field in FY98. Customs and DOE have developed a radiation detection training program. Implementation is being coordinated with FAA and airport authorities.

3.23--Give properly cleared airline and airport security personnel access to the classified information they need to know.

• FAA has worked closely with industry to ensure that security clearances are granted to those in industry who have a need and meet the requirements for a clearance. This long-standing program continues. The FAA has once again reaffirmed its policy to collaborate with airlines and airports in developing responses to threat information, and disseminate vulnerability assessments to appropriately cleared officials.

3.24--Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match.

• On December 23, 1997, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey and leading U.S. airlines announced that passenger bag matching will be expanded, using passenger screening to apply either examination by explosives detection systems or bag matching to domestic passengers’ luggage. Bag matching is a security measure in which a passenger’s bags will not be transported unless the passenger is on the flight. It already is done for travelers on international flights and has been done on a limited basis for domestic flights.

• Expanded bag matching will be based upon both computer and manual passenger screening systems during the transition to fully computerized passenger screening. The Computer Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) system (see Recommendation 3.19) is being used to select passengers whose checked baggage will be subjected to explosives detection examination or expanded bag matching. CAPS uses information from the reservation system to screen out passengers for whom additional security procedures are unnecessary. If not enough is known about a passenger to make a judgment, then additional security measures in the form of explosives detection device screening or bag matching will be applied. CAPS will also select some passengers at random for these additional security measures.

• CAPS is now being instituted. Use of CAPS will increase throughout 1998 while the manual process is phased out for those carriers having access to computerized reservation systems. The new computerized system is more efficient for airlines to use and protects against the release of sensitive security information. As the airlines voluntarily implement CAPS, the FAA will issue regulations requiring its use. The proposed rule for the automated system is being drafted and the final rule is targeted for completion this year.

3.25--Provide more compassionate and effective assistance to families of victims.

• See actions taken in Chapter 4.

3.26--Improve passenger manifests.

• The Department of Transportation issued on February 12, 1998, a final rule to require enhanced passenger manifests for flights to or from the United States. The rule will require U.S. and foreign air carriers to collect a full name from U.S citizens, as well as to solicit a contact name and phone number. Implementation of the rule will permit the Department of State to carry forth its responsibility to notify families of U.S. citizens killed overseas in a timely manner. In March 1997, DOT issued an ANRM to collect information on an enhanced passenger manifest system for domestic flights. DOT will review the implementation of the international rule during its consideration of the comments to the ANPRM.

3.27--Significantly increase the number of FBI agents assigned to counterterrorism investigations, to improve intelligence, and to crisis response.

• The FBI has expanded its counterterrorism program. Congress has provided funding for 644 Special Agents, 620 Support positions, and additional funding for investigations, intelligence gathering, forensic analysis, and crisis management. These additional personnel will be assigned to field offices throughout the United States to focus added resources in this critical area, improve our intelligence collection, and expand our management capabilities. It is anticipated that these field agents and support employees will be under transfer to the Counterterrorism Program by April 30, 1998.

3.28--Provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport security training to countries where there are airports served by airlines flying to the U.S.

• The FAA has been a full partner with the Department of State in support of its anti-terrorist assistance program for many years. FAA performs training need surveys and conducts training in airport security management. The FAA Academy’s international training service center in Oklahoma City provides airport security training on a fee-for-service basis to foreign countries.

• Since 1986, the U.S. Department of State and FAA have been providing anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport security training through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATAP). Additional training is provided to personnel at selected foreign airports where specialized assistance, as determined by the results of the FAA foreign airport assessments, is needed.

• Since the Commission's recommendations were released, over 270 people from 35 countries have been trained.

3.29--Resolve outstanding issues relating to explosive taggants and require their use.

• BATF is preparing to submit to Congress a report regarding the status, progress, findings and recommendations regarding the use of explosive taggants. The draft report has been reviewed by Treasury, OMB and others and has now been revised by BATF. The report was resubmitted to Treasury for final approval.

3.30--Provide regular, comprehensive explosives detection-training programs for foreign, federal, state, and local law enforcement, as well as FAA and airline personnel.

• The FAA has two explosives' specialists and nine regional coordinators who specialize in explosives related threat analysis, countermeasures development and training tailored to the needs of civil aviation security. Training has been conducted for law enforcement officers, consortia, airport managers, and security checkpoint screeners on a broad range of explosives' detection topics for both domestic and international audiences. Civil aviation security training was provided to military joint service Explosive Ordnance Disposal classes and regional conferences of the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators, and at the Annual European Bomb Technician's Symposium. During FY97 the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) conducted 9 explosives related courses for state and local law enforcement and prosecutors as well as 6 international post-blast classes on behalf of Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). Eight additional international classes are planned for FY98. BATF also conducted 3 certification and 5 recertification schools for explosive specialists, 1 class for certified fire investigators, and 10 post-blast schools for BATF agents.

• BATF and the FAA jointly produced four explosives security-training videos with instructor and student guides for both aviation industry and law enforcement use in their training programs. These videos cover an introduction to explosives and such topics as improvised explosive devices, airport bomb threat management, and dealing with suspected explosive devices discovered in the cabin of aircraft in-flight. The FAA's 8th annual conference on canine explosives detection was attended by 165 federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel who received 20 hours of training on explosives detection topics ranging from detection technology R&D to safety and other operational issues.

3.31--Create a central clearinghouse within government to provide information on explosives crime.

• The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) is working in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Bomb Data Center, all Federal, State, and local law enforcement and fire agencies to develop parameters and protocol for the repository information on arson and the criminal use of explosives. A number of coordinating meetings has been held and a system design company, Performance Engineering Contractors, has conducted interviews. FBI and BATF are discussing leadership roles in the central repository. Ultimately, this program will allow different levels of access to a central database of information through the Internet.

• The National Repository concept is based on BATF’s Explosives Incidents System (EXIS) and will now be called AEXIS for Arson and Explosives Incidents System. EXIS information is available to state, local, federal, and foreign enforcement agencies and can be used to match targets, motives, and similar incidents for incendiary and explosive devices. The system developer interviews have been completed and the AEXIS is currently being tested by BATF to resolve pre-operational problems.

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Table of Contents || Section 4: Responding to Aviation Disasters