Report on the January 1999 Detroit Snowstorm
INTRODUCTION
In a January 5, 1999, letter, Member of Congress John D. Dingell requested the Secretary of Transportation to review the response of Northwest Airlines and the Wayne County Department of Airports to the January 2-3, 1999, snowstorm at Wayne County Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Northwest Airlines largest hub airport. Other Members of Congress made similar requests. Pursuant to these requests, and prompted by dozens of passenger complaints concerning extended ground delays on Northwest Airlines aircraft that weekend, which were lodged with the Department of Transportations Aviation Consumer Protection Division, the Secretary assembled a team of individuals from the Department to prepare this Report.
This Report examines what occurred at the airport on Saturday, January 2 and Sunday, January 3, why it occurred, and what measures Northwest Airlines and the Wayne County Department of Airports are taking to try to prevent the repetition of the serious customer service problems that arose that weekend, in particular, the stranding of hundreds of passengers on aircraft queued on taxiways for up to 8½ hours. The review team's numerous findings regarding the causes of these ground delays can be summarized as follows:
Northwest and the Wayne County Department of Airports have taken or are considering taking several remedial actions to try to prevent a repetition of the lengthy ground delays of January 2 and 3, 1999. These actions include the following:
The Federal Aviation Administration has determined that neither the airport nor any air carrier serving Detroit violated Federal Aviation Regulations in their handling of the January 2-3 Detroit snowstorm. It is also important to note that even some of the angriest complaint letters received by the Department from passengers who experienced ground delays complimented the fine performance of Northwest's flight crews. However, notwithstanding the often exceptional efforts of those crews, conditions on many of the aircraft stranded on the airports taxiways were severe enough to have jeopardized passengers well being. These conditions included a shortage or complete lack of food, beverages, and water, and non-functioning lavatories. Conditions were particularly difficult for persons travelling with infants in need of formula or for persons with certain medical conditions. At least two individuals required emergency treatment by paramedics brought to the aircraft, and others were assisted by doctors already on board the aircraft. While these cases represented only a small percentage of the total number of passengers stranded by ground delays, they were serious and indicate that this event had important implications for passenger safety. Moreover, even if the well being of passengers had not been an issue, the review team believes that the stranding of passengers on aircraft queued on taxiways for up to 8½ hours invites more serious problems and is simply unacceptable. None of the other airlines serving Detroit experienced ground delays approaching the magnitude of Northwest's delays.
In understanding the events detailed in this Report, it is important to recognize the various roles and responsibilities that the Department of Transportation, the air carriers, and the airport have in handling major weather events like the January 2-3 Detroit snowstorm. The airport is responsible for the operating condition of the airport, including snow removal, and determines when a runway or taxiway must be closed. The Federal Aviation Administration, through its Air Traffic Control System, is responsible for the safe and efficient management of air traffic while aircraft are en route. While air carriers must always adhere to the Federal Aviation Regulations that are promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration, as well as the rules of the particular airports, individual airlines are responsible for managing disruptions to their schedules at particular airports. The airlines decide what flights to operate and have exclusive responsibility for canceling specific flights.
The review team interviewed over 60 individuals in preparing this report, including passengers, Northwest Airlines managers and executives in Detroit and in Minneapolis, Wayne County Department of Airports managers and executives, and representatives of other airlines serving the Wayne County Detroit Metropolitan Airport. The review team also relied on Northwest Airlines and the Wayne County Department of Airports documents concerning the snowstorm. The review team benefited greatly from the work performed by the staff of the Federal Aviation Administrations Great Lakes Regional Office in Chicago and the Minneapolis Flight Standards Certificate Management Office, both for their direct support of this report and for their input on relevant issues. The Department sincerely appreciates the time that all these individuals took to meet with the review team and discuss the snowstorm.
This report is divided into three Parts. Part I briefly describes the Wayne County Detroit Metropolitan Airport and Northwest Airlines operations there, Northwest Airlines operations planning organization at its Minneapolis headquarters, and then describes chronologically the January 2 Detroit snowstorm and its impact on the airport and on Northwest Airlines operations. Part II sets forth the review teams findings concerning why the events at the Wayne County Detroit Metropolitan Airport unfolded the way they did. These findings are grouped into six subject-matter areas: (1) Northwests arrival and departure planning; (2) Northwests assessment of its preparations for Sundays operations; (3) Wayne County Detroit Metropolitan Airports and Northwest Airlines snow removal operations; (4) aircraft positioning; (5) Sunday ground and flight crew staffing levels; and (6) Northwests treatment of passengers stranded on its aircraft. Part III reviews the actions that Northwest Airlines and Wayne County Department of Airports have taken or are considering taking to prevent a repetition of the lengthy ground delays of January 2 and 3.
Report on
the January 1999 Detroit Snowstorm
Part I ~ Part II ~ Part III ~ Appendices ~ Table of Contents